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Chapter 13
Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System
Monika Bütler

Old age insurance systems around the world face similar challenges. Rising
life expectancies and low birthrates produce a greater proportion of
elderly—and potentially frail—individuals in the population. Most social
security systems suffer from excessive promises made in the past, generating
substantial burdens on the active population. Recent turbulence in the
capital market increased funding gaps of pension plans. Reforms, though
necessary, are increasingly difﬁcult to implement. Immediate cuts harm
the elderly, as they cannot adjust quickly enough. Workers and ﬁrms are
more mobile than in the past, not only in a geographic sense, but also over
the life cycle. New patterns of work life have also emerged in part due to
higher female labor market participation. Last, but not least, individuals
want more autonomy in managing the provisions for old age. At the same
time, they are often not sufﬁciently informed about the functioning of social
insurance and the capital market.
Why look to Switzerland to examine how it is meeting this global challenge? Together with the Netherlands, Switzerland stands out as having a
strong reliance on its second pillar for old age income. In contrast to most
other countries with younger funded pension schemes, lessons can be
drawn from decades of experience. Two main policy concerns are addressed
in this chapter. First, while there is certainly evidence that policy is challenged by behavioral anomalies, it can also be plagued by strategic behavior:
‘too much’ rationality. Using the example of Swiss annuitization patterns in
retirement, we show that strategic decumulation of assets, given a generous
means-testing cushion, poses a serious threat to the system. Since ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts are below the level of subsistence, full cash-outs of occupational
pension capital jeopardize the adequacy of retirement income and may in
turn be costly for the government.
Second, the chapter discusses often-neglected political constraints in
reforming the old age system. As people live longer and have fewer children,
the median voter ages very quickly and the number of policy options shrinks.
This problem is even more visible in a country like Switzerland, where the
population has a factual line-item veto on policy proposals. Potentially
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painful pension reforms cannot simply be integrated into a larger package,
but have to be approved separately. However, political constraints are also
prevalent in representative democracies, albeit to a lesser extent. The evolution from decentralized provisions of income in old age with little government involvement to a more institutionalized and supervised pension
scheme brought many advantages such as transparency, equal treatment,
and economies of scale. But this larger and more institutionalized system is
much more difﬁcult to reform and more susceptible to political pressure.
The chapter also presents another aspect of the Swiss system that is of
interest for other countries: the treatment of families and couples in the
accumulation of claims to the pension system.
In Switzerland, a large fraction of retirement income stems from mandatory fully funded occupational pension plans, which provide generous
income guarantees. While individuals cannot choose the pension provider,
retirees have a number of withdrawal options upon retirement. Annuitization rates are still comparatively high, but they also vary greatly over time
and between pension providers. Interestingly, Switzerland’s second pillar
had been the primary source of retirement income for many decades, long
before the ﬁrst pillar of old age security was introduced in 1948. When the
second pillar became legally mandatory in 1985 (following a change in the
constitution approved by the Swiss electorate in 1972), almost 60 percent of
the Swiss workforce was covered by an occupational pension fund. This high
coverage rate was not only present for paternalistic reasons, but also because
pension plans have always been a tool to attract qualiﬁed workers in a low
unemployment environment.
Several authors have addressed features of the Swiss social security system.
Detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Swiss pension system
can be found in Queisser and Vittas (2000) and Queisser and Whitehouse
(2003). A World Bank report on annuity markets in Switzerland (Bütler and
Ruesch 2007) provides a comprehensive description of the Swiss system with
a focus on the second pillar. Bütler and Staubli (2011) take a closer look at
annuitization of pension wealth, while Bütler (2009) focuses on the labor
market.
The present chapter revisits the Swiss social security system in view of
upcoming challenges. We begin with an overview of the institutional structure with a focus on the occupational pension pillar, and then we discuss the
current demographic and economic situation in Switzerland. The following
section illustrates the choice to annuitize or cash out pension wealth. Finally,
we turn to a discussion of recent pension system reforms, with an emphasis
on the political process. We conclude with a summary and lessons to be
drawn for other countries from Swiss pensions.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/12/2015, SPi

Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System 249

The Swiss Pension Scheme: Institutions and Outcomes
Key elements
The two main pillars of Switzerland’s pension system are more or less of
equal importance. The ﬁrst pillar AHV/AVS is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
system and strives to provide a basic subsistence income level to all retired
residents. The second pillar is an employer-based, fully funded occupational
pension scheme, mandatory for all employees whose annual income
exceeds a certain threshold. Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts may be
claimed if a retiree’s total income does not cover his or her basic needs in
old age. A voluntary third pillar, which is an individual tax-deductible savings
account for retirement, complements the scheme (see Table 13.1).
table 13.1 Features of the Swiss old age pension system
Second pillar: occupational pension system
Payment type
Old age pension

Old person’s child’s
pension (paid for
dependent children)
Survivor beneﬁts

Supplementary
beneﬁts

Size of the payment
Depends on contribution history and average lifetime earnings.
The minimum and maximum full old age pensions are CHF 1,170
and CHF 2,340 per month, respectively; average old age pension is
CHF 2,013 per month (BSV 2013a).
40% of corresponding old age pension.

Depends on contribution history and average lifetime earnings of
deceased person. If the person has died before the age of 45,
prospective lifetime earnings are calculated. Survivor beneﬁts are
paid for widows and widowers with children and additionally widows
that meet certain criteria. Orphans (full and half) are eligible as
well until the age of 18 (25 if still in education). Widow and widower
beneﬁts are between CHF 936 and CHF 1,872, orphan children’s
beneﬁts are between CHF 468 and CHF 936.
Covers difference between basic living expenses (i.e. rent, health
insurance, nursing or other care, and other essential needs) and the
sum of old age pensions and other income. Means-tested beneﬁts
guarantee an income of roughly CHF 3,000 per month for singles
and CHF 4,500 for married couples. In 2012, the average meanstested beneﬁts were CHF 901 per month for people living at home
and CHF 2,893 for people living in a nursing home (BSV 2013b)

Second pillar: occupational pension system
Payment type
Old age pension

Size of the payment
Proportional to accumulated second pillar wealth at retirement.
From 2014, the annual full old age pension is 6.8% of the total old age
assets for both men and women in the mandatory coverage (up to an
annual income of 84,240 CHF). Conversion rates are lower on
income exceeding 84,240 CHF. Average second pillar old age beneﬁts
conditional on coverage were CHF 2,519 per month (BFS 2013).
(continued )
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table 13.1 Continued
Second pillar: occupational pension system
Payment type

Size of the payment

Old person’s child’s
pension

20% of corresponding old age pension per child; lower percentage
for high wage earners.

Survivor beneﬁts

Proportional to accumulated second pillar wealth at the time of death
of the insured person. Eligible for survivor beneﬁts are widows and
widowers with children or over the age of 45 if married for 10 years or
more. Most pension providers also offer beneﬁts for non-married
couples. Orphan (full and half) children are eligible as well until the
age of 18 (25 if still in education). Widow and widower beneﬁts are
60% of the ordinary second pillar invalidity (if person deceased before
pension age) or old age pension. Invalidity pensions are calculated by
extrapolating the ﬁnal old age assets, assuming that the individual
contributes at the same level with an interest rate of 0. Orphan
beneﬁts are 20% of the ordinary invalidity or old age pension.

Third pillar 3a: voluntary provision
Payment type
Capital from
voluntary
contributions

Size of the payment
As of 2013, the maximum contribution per year is CHF 6,739 for
individuals covered by a second pillar plan, and CHF 33,696 for
those not covered. Contributions can be deducted from taxable
income, but they can only be disposed of after pension age or when
buying real estate. Upon reception of the capital, the amount is
taxed at a reduced rate.

Sources : BSV (2013a, b); BFS (2013).

Taking the ﬁrst and second pillar together, an individual with an uninterrupted working career can expect a replacement rate of approximately
50–60 percent. The net replacement rate after taxes often amounts to
70–80 percent even for higher levels of income, and it can reach 100 percent
for beneﬁciaries with dependent children. In contrast to other countries,
Swiss replacement rates are similar for both lower and higher incomes due
to a careful integration of the ﬁrst and second pillars. In addition to
retirement income, the ﬁrst and second pillars also provide disability insurance, beneﬁts to surviving spouses and children, and to dependent children,
even if the main claimant is still alive.
First pillar beneﬁts depend weakly on income and in a linear way on the
number of contribution years, including those granted for childcare.
Conditional on having contributed at least 45 years to the system, a
minimum pension of 13,680 CHF (approx. US$15,000) per year is payable.
A majority of retirees qualiﬁes for a pension close to a maximum beneﬁt
level, which is equal to twice the minimum pension (i.e. 27,360 CHF). The
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statutory retirement age is 64 for women and 65 for men. The earliest age
at which ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts can be claimed is 62 for women and 63 for
men, subject to an actuarially fair beneﬁt reduction of 6.8 percent per
year. Working beyond age 64/65 is possible, but most work contracts
specify a retirement age that coincides with the statutory age of retirement. First pillar beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on earned
income, without a cap. They account for approximately 70 percent of
AVS/AHV revenue. The remaining ﬁnancing comes from earmarked
value-added taxes and a ﬁxed share of additional funds paid from general
government revenues (see Table 13.1).
Since 1966, means-tested supplemental beneﬁts may be claimed as part of
the ﬁrst pillar when total income does not cover basic needs in old age.
Eligibility for beneﬁts is limited to individuals who receive an old age or
disability pension, live in Switzerland and have Swiss or EU citizenship, or
have been living in Switzerland for at least 10 years. These additional
beneﬁts usually result in an income that is above the poverty threshold.
The guaranteed total income is approximately 36,000 CHF for singles and
51,000 CHF for couples (without children).
A voluntary third pillar of individual savings complements the ﬁrst and
second pillars for retirement. Given the already high replacement rate
provided by the ﬁrst and second pillar, the third pillar is primarily important
for the self-employed (who are not covered by the second pillar), and for
individuals with contribution gaps. Since contributions are fully taxdeductible up to a certain amount, the third pillar has also become a
popular instrument for middle- and high-income earners to save taxes.

Occupational pension scheme
The second pillar in Switzerland is based on occupational pensions, mandated by law, but organized by employers. Several possible organizational
forms vary by the degree the pension sponsor handles risks, the two polar
cases being autonomous pension funds with little or no outside insurance
for risks such as longevity and investment risks, and collective organizations which sub-contract all risks with an insurer. Typical examples of
autonomous funds are pension schemes directly related to a company,
but legally independent. Typical examples of collective organizations are
insurance companies that offer standard contracts to employers to organize the second pillar in both the accumulation and decumulation phase.
Table 13.2 gives an overview of the type and size of different pension plan
structure.
The accumulation of retirement assets and their withdrawal as annuities
or lump sums are usually organized by the same pension provider. The
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table 13.2 Size and structure of occupational pension plans
Type of risk coverage

Autonomous (with & without
reinsurance)
of which private

No. of
pension
sponsors

No. of
covered
individuals

women (%)

DC (%)

838

2,316,785

44.9

74.9

758

1,675,155

40.6

83.3

Partly autonomous (pension
guaranteed by insurance and
reinsurance)

1,058

588,665

37.6

91.8

of which private

1,050

586,070

37.5

91.8

Collective (all risks with an
insurance)

163

1,003,579

37.0

91.5

of which private

161

1,002,970

37.0

91.5

Total (without savings account)

2,059

3,909,029

41.8

81.7

of which private

1,969

3,264,195

38.9

87.4

Source : BFS (2014a).

strong link between the accumulation and decumulation phases is an
important feature of the Swiss system. The institutions that implement
occupational pension schemes according to the terms of the BVG/LPP
law (Bundesgesetz über die beruﬂiche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge) must be registered. The managing body must include as many
representatives of employees as of employers, having the same rights.

Individual contributions and beneﬁts
Participation in the occupational pension scheme is mandatory for all
employees with annual earnings of 21,060 CHF or more. Approximately
96 percent of working men and 83 percent of working women are covered
by the second pillar. The insured income above the threshold and below an
upper threshold (at present 82,080 CHF) is called the mandatory part. The
income above the upper threshold is called the super-mandatory part of the
second pillar. While the mandatory part is subject to stringent regulation—
minimum contribution rates, minimum interest rates, and the conversion
rate—there are few restrictions on the contract conditions offered by the
insurance companies in the super-mandatory part. By law, pension plan
providers are required to insure the mandatory share. They are free to
provide insurance for the super-mandatory part as well, and most do because
the second pillar is important in attracting a well-educated workforce. Both
mandatory and super-mandatory pension contributions are tax-exempt.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/12/2015, SPi

Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System 253

Contributions to the occupational pension plans correspond to a certain
fraction of an employee’s salary (depending on his age), of which the
employer has to pay at least half. When an employee starts working at another
company, all of the accumulated contributions (including the employer’s
part) are transferred to the new fund. The total amount of assets at retirement
is thus accumulated over the entire working life and is a good proxy for
lifetime income. A majority of individuals are covered by DC plans, though
given the stringent regulation and income guarantees for all plans, the
difference between DB and DC plan is small. Even in DB plans, in which
beneﬁts are based on a ﬁnal salary, contribution gaps must be closed to
qualify for full beneﬁts in retirement. For example, an individual’s pay
increase triggers the need for additional payments to the plan. On the
other hand, extensive income guarantees for DC—a minimum interest rate
on accumulated assets, a minimum conversion rate, reinsurance of pension
income up to 150 percent mandatory coverage, no obligation for retirees to
cover ﬁnancial shortfalls—make DC plans look very much like DB plans.
The occupational pension wealth can be withdrawn either as a monthly
lifelong annuity, a lump sum, or a combination of the two components. In
some plans, the cash-out limit is equal to 50 or 25 percent of accumulated
capital (the legal minimum). In most plans, individuals must declare their
choice between three months and three years prior to the effective withdrawal date, depending on the insurer’s regulations. Many pension insurers
deﬁne a default option if the beneﬁciary does not make an active choice.
In 2012 approximately 30 percent of new retirees (which includes individuals not covered by the second pillar) got a lump sum payment at retirement
(up from 24 percent in 2004).
Occupational pension annuities are proportional to the accumulated
retirement assets (contributions made during the working lifetime plus
accrued interest). Retirement capital K is translated into a yearly nominal
annuity B using the conversion rate ª: B=ª*K. The conversion rate is independent of marital status, income, or gender (at least in the mandatory part),
but it does depend on the retirement age. By law, the annuity option includes
dependent children’s beneﬁts of up to 20 percent of the main claimant’s
beneﬁt for each child younger than 18 (or below the age of 25 if still
dependent), as well as survivor beneﬁts equal to 60 percent of the deceased’s
pension. Combined with a uniform conversion rate, these additional beneﬁts
create a sizeable redistribution between married and non-married male
annuitants. On average, female annuitants create the same costs as males,
with their longer life expectancy compensated by low expected survivor
beneﬁts. Pension funds are requested to index annuities to inﬂation, if the
fund’s ﬁnancial situation allows it to do so. At present, only a few funds are
actually able to index pensions to inﬂation, due mainly to the great liabilities
created by a very high conversion factor in the mandatory part.
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The annuity is subject to normal progressive income tax rates. Additional
income from other sources, for example from the ﬁrst pillar, increases the
effective marginal tax rate under the annuity option. The lump sum, on
the other hand, is taxed only once (at retirement). The tax rate applied
to the capital option varies greatly across Swiss cantons. The present value of
the tax bill is almost always smaller under the lump sum option compared to
the annuity option, particularly for average and higher levels of second
pillar pension wealth. Therefore, the differential tax treatment is expected
to reduce the demand for an annuity.

Regulation
The BVG/LPP law speciﬁes minimum requirements along several dimensions. While a regulation of the contribution rates and certain restrictions
on payout options are not uncommon in an international context, the law
also mandates the minimum interest rate for old age credits and the conversion factor at which the accumulated pension capital has to be translated
into a lifelong annuity. The minimum interest rate on accumulated old age
balances is determined by the federal council and is periodically adjusted
taking into account market data. Figure 13.1 depicts the evolution of the
minimum interest rate together with market interest rates and the so-called
technical interest rate (not regulated by law) used to discount future liabilities of the plan. Figure 13.1 also contains the returns of a ﬁctional pension
fund portfolio containing 40 percent shares. This portfolio proxies the
returns of a typical pension fund investment portfolio pretty well. It illustrates the high volatility of market returns in recent years. Minimum interest
requirements thus greatly smooth the accumulation of old age balances, but
create risks for the sponsors.
The conversion rate (the annuity factor) is ﬁxed by law. As a consequence,
it is even more open to political pressure than the minimum interest rate, as
will be demonstrated in this chapter. Until 2004 and despite large changes
in market conditions over the previous 20 years, the minimum conversion
rate in the mandatory part was ﬁxed at 7.2 percent. With the aim of
improving the stability of the second pillar, the Swiss government implemented a series of changes in 2004, 2005, and 2006. An integral part of these
changes was that the minimum conversion rate in the mandatory part was
successively lowered to 6.8 percent by 2015. Pension funds are free to set the
conversion rate in the less-regulated super-mandatory part of the second
pillar, but until 2003, conversion rates in the mandatory and supermandatory part were virtually identical. In 2004, several large pension
funds started to reduce the conversion rate in the super-mandatory part to
5.4 percent for women and 5.8 percent for men. Since then most other
pension funds have followed. Surprisingly, there is little variation over time
in the conversion rate not only for the tightly regulated mandatory part, but

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/12/2015, SPi

Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System 255
4

16

3

12

2

8

1

4

0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

0
2013

-1

-4

-2

-8

-3

-12

-4

-16
min. interest rate

technical interest rate

10y Swiss gvt bond

Pictet LPP-40% shares (right scale)

Figure 13.1 Interest rates for Swiss occupational pension plans
Notes : The minimum interest rate is determined by the Swiss federal council and is periodically
adjusted. The technical interest rate is used to discount future liabilities of a pension plan. Pictet
LPP-40% represents a synthetic investment with 40% shares, a typical portfolio of sufﬁciently
funded pension plans.
Sources : D. Cecil, Fondation Pictet (personal communication, June 19, 2014); SNB (2014);
Swisscanto (2014); Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (2014); J. Steiger, BSV (personal communication, June 16, 2014).

also in the virtually unregulated super-mandatory part. This is another
informal indicator for the high utility value attached to policy smoothing,
which is typical for Switzerland’s high-stability environment.
The pension funds also have to meet certain requirements on the degree
of funding, their investment structure, as well as on transparency issues.
There is little regulation (and even less reliable representative data) on the
asset and liability management of the different pension funds.

Current demographic and economic situation
and labor markets
As in other industrialized countries, the demographic situation in Switzerland has seen a substantial increase in life expectancy and a low fertility rate.
As shown in Table 13.3, the total fertility rate declined from 2.1 children per
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table 13.3 Demographic trends in Switzerland

Total fertility rate
Life expectancy at age 65
Men
Women
Old age dependency ratio

1970

2000

2030

2.1

1.5

1.52

13.3
16.2
17.7

17.3
21.1
25

21.8
24.7
43

Change
0.58
+8.5
+8.5
+25.3

Notes : Old age dependency ratio is the number of individuals aged 65 and over relative to the
number of individuals aged 20 to 64.
Source : BFS (2014d), numbers according to middle scenario A-00-2010.

woman in 1970, to 1.5 children per woman in 2000. Over the same period,
the remaining life expectancy at age 65 increased for men from 13.3 to 17.3
years and for women from 16.2 to 21.1 years. This rise in life expectancy is
projected to continue at the same rate until 2030. This demographic transition is producing a substantial increase in the old age dependency ratio.
The proportion of individuals age 65+ to those age 21–64 has grown from
approximately 18 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in 2000 and it will increase
further to 43 percent in 2030.
Despite the country’s low fertility rates, the Swiss population is aging at a
slower rate than most other European nations, due to high rates of immigration. Nonetheless, the rising old age dependency ratio has a direct
impact on the ﬁnancial stability of the ﬁrst pillar. If the current levels of
contributions and beneﬁts are left unchanged, the scheme will start running
a sustained deﬁcit very soon (see Table 13.3).

Employment of elderly workers as a way
to alleviate the pension problem
Switzerland has a ﬂexible labor market, a low unemployment rate as well as a
low implicit tax rate on working beyond the age of 65 (for most individuals).
Moreover, retirement at 65 or 64 is not legally mandatory, but represents
eligibility for full public pension beneﬁts. Individuals are free to postpone
payment of beneﬁts for up to three years at actuarially fair rates. Nevertheless, most labor contracts specify a retirement age—in most cases still
mandatory—that coincides with the age of eligibility.
The positive work incentives are diluted to some degree by income effects
due to high replacement rates even for high-income earners and generous
means-tested supplementary beneﬁts (Bütler and Teppa 2007; Bütler et al.
2013a, 2013b). These and widespread early retirement plans provided by
occupational pension plans in the 1990s and early 2000s have shrunk the

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/12/2015, SPi

Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System 257
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 55–64

Total 65+

M 55–64

M 65+

F 55–64

F 65+

Figure 13.2 Labor force participation of elderly individuals in Switzerland
Notes : M = men, F = women.
Source: BFS (2014b).

traditionally high labor force participation rate of elderly workers (see
Figure 13.2). Since the turn of the millennium, the employment rate of
older men has been more or less stable and may even be seen to increase
slightly again.
An equally interesting fact is that the participation rate of women over age
50 has risen in the last decades, most dramatically for those of age 60–4. This
can be attributed in part to the increase in the statutory age of retirement
from 62 to 64, although the increase was weakened by a transitory decrease in
the actuarial adjustment for early retirement from 6.8 percent to 3.4 percent.
Hanel and Riphahn (2006) show that despite the relatively small reduction of
retirement beneﬁts by 3.4 percent during the transition period, more than 70
percent of females decided to postpone beneﬁt take-up to the new retirement
age. Turning to employment rates beyond the normal retirement age of 65,
Switzerland saw a decrease in participation for quite some time until a reversal
of the trend around 2005. This date coincided with the reform of the second
pillar and the tightening of early retirement conditions in most plans. The
increase in labor participation of individuals older than age 65 has hardly
been affected by the ﬁnancial crisis (see Figure 13.2).
Employment of older people may also encounter difﬁculties due to other
factors, such as health and working conditions. Using SHARE data, Bütler
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and Engler (2008) showed that although incentives still dominate all other
aspects, health and working conditions also play a role in the labor market
participation of elderly individuals. Employed persons in Switzerland are
less often afﬂicted with health problems than in other European countries.
Individuals with favorable working conditions as measured by job satisfaction,
appreciation for work performance, and adequate pay and career opportunities are less likely to retire early.

Adequacy of retirement income for spouses
Adequacy of pension income is an important policy concern not only for
the primary earner, but also for the surviving spouse in old age, most
importantly for the partner who took care of children, and for the frail
elderly during the accumulation phase. Decisions such as marriage, having
children, and employment over the life cycle inﬂuence not only current
disposable income, but also long-term ﬁnancial resources of household
members.
The provision of adequate consumption in old age had traditionally been
a task of the family. Interestingly, it was the lack of income for widows that
drove the political process to adopt a public pension system in Switzerland.
With the emergence of formal pension plans, the dominant family-based
income provision model was replaced by a pension rights based approach.
The Swiss ﬁrst pillar, AHV/AVS, started from the assumption of a permanent marriage in which the husband had the role of the breadwinner while
the wife mainly took over unpaid childcare and household work. Married
couples received a so-called couple pension, amounting to 150 percent of a
single pension, which was related to the pension contributions of the husband. The wife could not claim her own pension, but she received a
generous widow’s pension in the event of her husband’s death.
Social liberalization seen in the later twentieth century changed the
character of family ties and a multitude of lifestyles weakened the traditional
family arrangements. While the nuclear family continued to form the social
reference model and the number of marriages remained high, divorce rates
also increased sharply in the late 1980s.
To adapt the pension system to societal change, both main pillars were
reformed in the 1990s, based on a separation of premarital acquired pension rights and the division of acquired claims during marriage. The tenth
AHV revision created a separate pension for both spouses based on individual notional accounts, where individual accounts record all pensionable
contributions over the entire working life of a person. During marriage,
spouses’ contributions are equally split, including care credits. The latter is a
ﬁctitious income equal to three times the minimum pension granted for the
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total number of years in which the family takes care of children younger
than age 16. Nonetheless, to maintain the character of a basic income
and for ﬁnancial reasons, total beneﬁts of a couple remained capped at
150 percent of maximum individual pension beneﬁts. While the reform
promoted independence of the wife, it also created unintended incentives.
For many women the generosity of childcare credits and the splitting of
contributions led to a situation in which future pensions did not depend on
their work income. This reduced the incentive of the secondary earner to
work. For medium and higher incomes (roughly 60 percent of all couples),
moreover, the cap creates a marriage penalty in retirement.
As a second change, a major reform of the divorce law regulated the
mutual claims of the partners with respect to the accumulated pension
assets in the second pillar during marriage. In case of a divorce, each spouse
is now entitled to half the partner’s accumulation during marriage, including interest earned. The split of the pension credits is mandatory and is
outside the marital property consideration in the divorce case. In contrast to
the ﬁrst pillar reform, the mandatory split of funded plan balances did not
impact labor supply of the secondary earner directly. If at all, it created a
positive incentive to take up paid work, as employment-related pension
plans provide better protection and higher beneﬁts than stand-alone pension plans.
While the reforms of the two pillars hardly changed the material situation
for intact marriages in retirement, they had an impact on the bargaining
power of the spouses in retirement, and the income of both partners in case
of divorce. The changes not only shifted some retirement income from the
primary to the secondary earner, but also increased combined retirement
income for a majority of divorced spouses. Figure 13.3 depicts the evolution
of divorce rates before and after the reforms. The changes in the divorce
law as well as the pension reforms are mirrored by the data. Obviously, the
reforms affect both timing and likelihood of divorce. First, the divorce rates
ﬂuctuate around the time of the revision of the divorce law, going down
prior to, and rebounding after the change. It seems that some couples
anticipated divorce in view of the changes, while others waited until the
reform was in place. Second, the relative difference in divorce rates
between older couples and the total population decreased signiﬁcantly
after the period of social reforms. This pattern suggests that the change
in individual claims as a consequence of the pension reforms might have
led to an economic reevaluation of marriage and divorce (see Figure 13.3).
In the last few years, divorce rates of elderly couples have almost reached
the average divorce rate of the population, suggesting that factors other
than pensions play a role. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the relative and
discontinuous change in divorce rates around the period of reform remains
very large.
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Figure 13.3 Divorce rates for couples between 55 and 75 and total Swiss divorce rates
Source : BFS (2014c).

Annuitization: Not Rational, or Rather Too Rational?
Making decisions for many decades ahead is a difﬁcult task, so it comes as no
surprise that behavioral anomalies in retirement planning abound. While
some of the mistakes that individuals could make are taken care of by public
pension plans and regulation, others remain. The shift from a highly regulated ﬁrst pillar with little choice to a more individual pension plan, often
with many options to choose from, makes mistakes more costly for both
individuals and the government. Behavioral mistakes have sparked a huge
literature analyzing the anomalies and coming up with better alternatives.
While there is certainly evidence that policy is challenged by behavioral
anomalies, it might be equally challenged by strategic behavior, or ‘too
much’ rationality. Strategic behavior could be as costly for the government
as investment or spending mistakes. Undersaving, for example, might be
caused by individuals underestimating their income needs in old age, or it
might equally likely be caused by individuals who anticipate the government
footing the bill in case of ﬁnancial shortfalls in old age.
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Behavioral anomalies and rational behavior often go hand in hand as
illustrated in the following example. Bütler et al. (2013b) exploit the large
and sudden cutback in the conversion rate in the super-mandatory part to
examine how changes in annuity values impact the annuitization decision.
This can be identiﬁed by comparing the annuitization behavior of individuals who were affected by the reduction in the conversion rate with observably similar individuals who were covered by an insurance company that did
not reduce the conversion rate. The 20 percent reduction in the annuity
value led to an approximately 14 percentage point drop in the annuitization
rate. Interestingly, this policy change also triggered substantial anticipatory
behavior: individuals who had planned to retire after the policy change
shifted their retirement to earlier dates to take advantage of the favorable
conditions prior to the change. In particular, there was a large spike in the
number of retirees in the month prior to when the lower conversion rates
became effective. The pattern suggests that individuals were well aware of
the large loss in the annuity value.
Bütler et al. (2013b) also showed that almost all beneﬁciaries chose a
polar option and did not distinguish between the mandatory and supermandatory part, although implicit annuity prices were dramatically different
after the reduction in the conversion rate in 2004. Taking out the supermandatory capital as a lump sum and annuitizing the mandatory part should
have been the dominating strategy for a majority of individuals who took out
the full lump sum. That they did not do so is consistent with the proposition
that many retirees do not make fully informed choices.
Using as an example the Swiss annuitization patterns in retirement, this
section illustrates the tension between not-rational-enough behavior and
potentially ‘too rational’ strategies. Cash-out decisions are inﬂuenced by
three main factors: money’s worth ratios, behavioral anomalies, and generous means-tested supplemental beneﬁts that act as a supplementary longevity insurance. While the impact of generous income guarantees have been
discussed elsewhere (Bütler and Staubli 2011; Bütler and Ruesch 2007), we
will focus on the latter two factors illustrated by individual retirement
decisions from Swiss occupational pension plans.

Not so rational: behavioral factors in
annuitization decisions
The behavioral economics literature has been able to account for many
aspects of retirement planning, such as participation in employer-provided
pension plans (Duﬂo and Saez 2003), contribution rates (Beshears et al.
2008), and portfolio allocation decisions (Choi et al. 2009). The recent
literature on the determinants of individual cash-out behavior suggests
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Figure 13.4 Annuitization rates for six pension providers prior to the reform of
the occupational pension law in 2005 (which triggered a number of changes). Stable
parameters (exception: decrease in supermandatory conversion rate for Insurance
I in 2004)
Source : Individual data from Swiss pension plans.

that behavioral biases also play an important role in the annuitization
decision (Benartzi et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2013). Brown et al. (2008), for
example, show that framing matters for the annuitization decision. Under
an ‘investment frame’ that focused on risk and return, only 21 percent of the
individuals preferred a life annuity over a savings account. On the other
hand, under a ‘consumption frame’ that highlighted the consequences for
lifelong consumption, 72 percent chose the life annuity. More recent contributions in the ﬁeld try to come up with recommendations to improve
individual decision-making using nudges and defaults, thus increasing the
likelihood that people will choose the annuity (Beshears et al. 2014).
Figure 13.4 provides graphical evidence of how Swiss defaults inﬂuenced
the fraction of capital cashed out at retirement. While good aggregate
statistics are hard to get, on average 60 to 70 percent of all individuals
annuitize their accumulated pension wealth. Figure 13.4 presents the fraction of capital cashed out at retirement based on administrative records
from several pension funds and large insurance companies. On average and
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consistent with aggregate numbers, annuitization rates are high, but there
are also large and persistent differences between different plan sponsors.
A part of the difference can be attributed to a composition effect: individuals covered by collective funds tend to earn less and to be poorer, as
measured by their accumulated pension wealth. Nevertheless, annuitization
patterns remain virtually unchanged after controlling for composition.
More importantly, there are differences in the standard cash-out option
at retirement for otherwise almost identical pension plans. Only between
10 to 30 percent of all individuals covered by an autonomous pension plan
cash out all or a fraction of their pension wealth, but even for these autonomous pensions plans, annuitization patterns differ. Interestingly, the two
companies with the highest annuitization rates are companies in the tradition of deﬁned beneﬁts (Textile and Public Service in Figure 13.4). The next
two companies (Manufact A and B in Figure 13.4), on the other hand, have a
deﬁned contribution tradition. In all four companies mentioned, individuals
were allowed to cash out their full or partial retirement balances. But they
had to take the initiative if they wished to choose this option, informing the
pension sponsors six to 36 months prior to retirement.
The insurance companies, labeled Insurance I and II, take another
approach. The sponsor takes the initiative and actively informs the contributors ahead of time about the choices they can make. The difference between
Insurance I and Insurance II is that the former forces individuals to make an
active decision (no default), while the latter has an annuity default option,
which is also communicated to the individuals. This seemingly small difference triggers a stable gap in annuitization rates of approximately 10 percentage points (after controlling for composition effects) between the two
very similar plans (Bütler et al. 2013b).
The annuitization behavior in Swiss occupational pension plans is in line
with our previous research on the role of behavioral factors in cash-out
decisions at retirement (Bütler and Teppa 2007). For instance individuals
mostly stick with the sponsor’s default option, rather than making an active
decision. In particular, the likelihood to cash out pension wealth is signiﬁcantly higher in companies that provide the (partial) lump sum as a default.
Interestingly, several small pension funds displayed almost no variation with
respect to the annuitization decision: all retirees chose either the lump sum
or the annuity. Pension fund managers usually explain the phenomenon by
referring to peer effects and an implicit standard option (‘it has always been
done like that’).
The high rate of annuitization in Switzerland may also be attributed to the
framing of the scheme: occupational pension beneﬁts were traditionally framed
as annuities, and very recently, many contributors to the system were
unaware of the sum of money they had accumulated, though they knew
the approximate amount of their monthly payments. To improve
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transparency, starting in 2005 all pension funds were required to provide
insured participants with a yearly statement (many funds offered such
statements already before the mandatory introduction). The statement
declares the amount of capital accumulated to date and reports the
expected approximate annuity stream (based on an extrapolation of current earnings and interest rates). Interestingly, with respect to framing, for
most plans the space on the paper given to annuity streams (which also
include survivor beneﬁts and beneﬁts in case of disability) is much larger
compared to the space given to the accumulated capital. The statement on
an individual’s occupational pension beneﬁts thus comes close to what
Brown et al. (2008) call a ‘consumption frame,’ which they found was likely
to induce beneﬁciaries to choose the annuity.

‘Too’ rational: means-tested beneﬁts and annuitization
Approximately 12 percent of all Swiss retirees receive means-tested beneﬁts
as part of the ﬁrst pillar, because their total income does not cover basic
needs in old age. These very generous supplemental beneﬁts have contributed to a low poverty rate among the elderly in Switzerland, but they may
also have had unintended consequences for the annuitization decision. In
particular, because means-tested beneﬁts provide an implicit insurance
against outliving one’s assets, older individuals have a strong incentive to
cash out their accumulated pension wealth. For the government, strategic
decumulation of assets in view of a generous means-testing world can
be very costly.
The yearly amount of means-tested beneﬁts is obtained by summing up all
applicable expenditures and subtracting all pension income, investment
income, and earnings, plus one-tenth of wealth exceeding a threshold
level of 25,000 CHF for singles and 40,000 CHF for married claimants.
Applicable expenditures include a cost of living allowance, health insurance
expenditures, and rent payments. Given that pension income is fully taken
into account in the calculation of means-tested beneﬁts, an annuity offsets
the means-tested beneﬁts one for one. By contrast, a lump-sum payment has
no effect on supplemental beneﬁts as long as the total wealth (including the
lump sum) is below the threshold level. Even if the total wealth does exceed
the threshold, only one-tenth of wealth is credited against means-tested
beneﬁts. Moreover, since the eligibility age for beneﬁts in pension plans is
typically younger than the statutory retirement age, the lump sum can be
used to ﬁnance early retirement. Once the statutory age of retirement is
reached, means-tested beneﬁts can be claimed.
The incentive to cash out their pension in order to apply for means-tested
beneﬁts later is particularly strong for those having little pension wealth.
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Figure 13.5 Percentage of capital annuitized as a function of accumulated second
pillar wealth (upper curves). Percentage of individuals opting for a mixed payout
(10% capital or more, plus 10% annuity or more)
Source : Individual data from Swiss pension plans.

Middle-income individuals, by contrast, have to weigh the beneﬁt of taking a
lump sum and later receiving generous supplemental beneﬁts, against
the disadvantage of not being able to smooth consumption optimally. Maximal ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts amount to roughly 2,000 CHF per month. The
means-tested beneﬁts increase total income to approximately 3,000 CHF a
month. Thus an individual with a monthly second-pillar beneﬁt of less than
1,000 CHF a month (which corresponds to accumulated occupational pension wealth of approximately 170,000 CHF) and little non-pension wealth is
always better off withdrawing the accumulated capital upon retirement,
spending it quickly, and then applying for means-tested beneﬁts.
Figure 13.5 plots the fraction of individuals who annuitized at retirement
as a function of the level of old age capital. Clearly, the frequency of taking an
annuity is low for people with small capital stocks, and it increases with higher
levels of second pillar wealth. This pattern is also in line with Bütler and
Teppa (2007) who showed that the probability of annuitizing increases with
accumulated wealth. In Bütler et al. (2013a), it is shown that optimal annuity
demand and consumption patterns derived from a realistic life cycle model
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under a social security scheme calibrated to the Swiss scheme comes close to
the observed payout pattern. A comparison of model results and real-world
data suggests that means-tested beneﬁts do substantially decrease annuity
demand for individuals with low or medium levels of pension wealth.
These ﬁndings do not preclude other explanations for the increase in
annuitization rates with accumulated capital. For instance, less wealthy
individuals may favor the lump sum because they tend to have a higher
mortality risk. However, the likelihood to annuitize continues to increase
even for relatively high levels of pension wealth where health is not an
important factor. The same is true for women, for whom differential mortality is very small. Moreover, it is well known that ﬁnancial literacy is
positively correlated with income and wealth (see e.g. Lusardi and
Mitchell 2007). Therefore, annuitization rates may increase with accumulated capital just because wealthier individuals make more informed
choices. The increasing frequency of taking a mixed option with accumulated capital may be interpreted as indirect evidence for a positive relationship between investment skills and (pension) wealth. On the other hand, tax
incentives to opt for a split between the lump sum and the annuity instead of
a polar option also go up for increasing levels of pension wealth.
Strategic decumulation of retirement savings not only inﬂuences individual consumption proﬁles, but it also generates costs to the government via
two channels. The ﬁrst arises because of the direct ﬁnancial costs of boosting
retirement incomes to the subsistence level. The second channel results
from an induced change in behavior. If individuals switch from an annuity
to a cash-out option, the government provides insurance to those with a
higher expected income, while the unused assets of those with a premature
death fall to the heirs and not the insurance provider. Bütler et al. (2013a)
show the beneﬁts and costs of various reforms to limit government expenditures. A ﬁrst reform might ban cash-outs altogether, while a second would
mandate annuitization only to a level corresponding to the subsistence level
at retirement. In the latter case, the government still picks up the bill for
those with a lump sum in case of low capital returns or high inﬂation. As a
last reform option, a tightening of the asset test is considered, which would
eliminate the possibility of claiming means-tested beneﬁts before one’s
capital is completely exhausted. As before, this policy change would
decrease the burden for society directly via a later claiming time when
people have to run down assets completely, and indirectly through higher
annuitization rates so people avoid low consumption in old age. The indirect effect would be strong enough to halve the wedge between optimal and
observed annuitization rates. While limiting cash-outs seems like the obvious
solution to the problem of strategic decumulation, one has to keep in mind
distributional aspects. Low-income people would suffer the most from limiting cash outs, also because they usually have a lower life expectancy.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/12/2015, SPi

Insights from Switzerland’s Pension System 267

Swiss annuitization patterns suggest that individuals navigate some complex decisions in ways that are highly rational. At the same time, people are
also inﬂuenced by behavioral factors such as defaults. But what determines
whether and when individuals act very rationally or not rationally enough?
There is of course almost no direct empirical evidence for potential reasons
for either of the two behavioral patterns. A ﬁrst indication might be the
surprisingly large differences in individual decisions between companies (as
is clear from Figure 13.5 and is also discussed in Bütler and Teppa 2007). It
seems that at least some implicit or explicit advice is taken from discussions
and information at the workplace. Due to the tight link between accumulation and payout phase, formal advice from ﬁnancial intermediaries plays a
minor role. The public debate around means-tested beneﬁts in old age
might have induced individuals to think more clearly through the consequences of choosing between a lump sum and an annuity at retirement.

Future Reforms Under Political Constraints
While the three pillar structure of the Swiss old age insurance system is
generally undisputed, both the ﬁrst and second pillars will have to tackle the
problem of too-generous beneﬁts combined with insufﬁcient contributions.
Attempts to stabilize the Swiss pension system have proven to be difﬁcult, not
least because the Swiss political system is based on direct democracy. Swiss
policymakers face strong political constraints for potential reforms, as the
public possesses what amounts to veto power (Bütler 2009). Any change in
the law can be (and usually is) challenged by a facultative referendum.
The last time the ﬁrst pillar was reformed was in 1997, when the female
retirement age was raised from 62 to 64. All further attempts to reform
the system have failed so far either in parliament or at the ballot. There have
been few fundamental changes in the second pension pillar. In view of the
increase in life expectancy at age 65 of about three years since 1985, and
the fall in capital market returns, the conversion factor should have been
reduced by approximately 15 to 20 percent. Nevertheless, minimum interest
rates and the conversion factor have remained constant for almost 20 years.
The illusion of perpetual stability was only squashed after the stock market
downturn at the beginning of 2000. At that time, market returns fell below
the 4 percent minimum return requirement and many pension funds
became underfunded. After an intense political debate, the Swiss Federal
Council agreed to reduce the minimum return requirement to 3.25 percent
as of January 1, 2003. Since then, the interest rate has been adjusted several
times and now follows market interest rates more closely than before (see
Figure 13.1).
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The Swiss parliament also changed the occupational pension scheme in
2005, including new regulations concerning transparency, an extension of
the coverage of the second pillar to low-income and part-time workers, and a
step-wise, but small reduction of the conversion rate in the mandatory part
to 6.8 percent by 2015. The adjustments in the second pillar proved too
weak to trigger any serious political opposition, but also far too weak to
secure long-run sustainability of the scheme.
How difﬁcult it can be to change the public’s vested interests can be
illustrated by a recent vote on the conversion rate (or annuity factor). As a
consequence of the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis, the government proposed
another reduction, on top of the already implemented reform. But in March
2010, 73 percent of Swiss voters chose not to reduce the second pillar
conversion rate. Since most national votes are evaluated by a telephone
survey of individuals who participated in the ballot (the so-called VOX
database), we are able to analyze results. Table 13.4 presents the results of
a simple regression analysis on the potential determinants of this outcome
on individual survey data (ﬁrst column in Table 13.4), complemented by an
analysis of community level data in which the approval rate of the initiative is
regressed on similar socio-economic variables.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation of Table 13.4 we regress the outcome ‘approve
the reduction in the conversion rate’ (1 = approval) on individual demographic and socio-economic variables taken from the survey. In the second
speciﬁcation, the approving vote share of 2,400 Swiss communities is
regressed on similar aggregate indicators. The results are informative:
French- and Italian-speaking individuals and communities were signiﬁcantly
less willing to approve the conversion rate cut than the German-speaking
individuals/communities, in line with previous research (Eugster et al.
2011). The most likely interpretations are cultural differences between the
regions (as economic variables play a minor role), or minority groups
voicing a concern against social insurance cuts imposed by the dominant
language group (German). A second interesting result has to do with trust.
For the analysis on individual data, distrust was one of the most inﬂuential
variables shaping the vote.
Surprisingly, approval of a cut in beneﬁts increases in a more or less linear
way with age (in several speciﬁcations tested). While individuals already
retired or who are close to retirement age soon would have been grandfathered (and might have beneﬁted indirectly from the reform in the form
of more secure income streams), the ranking of middle-aged and young
voters is surprising. Given that the young would have beneﬁted most from a
reduced conversion rate (and thus lower forced redistribution), the low
support of the reform by this group is a puzzle.
Other demographics had the expected signs. Better educated voters were
more likely to approve the reform. Richer individuals and those owning an
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table 13.4 Political support for a reduction in the conversion rate (annuity factor),
individual data from telephone survey after the ballot

Person aged 65 and over

Individual

Community

Dependent
variable:

Dependent
variable:

Yes (=1) in
ballot)

Percentage yes-votes
in Community

0.189***
(0.035)

Share of population aged 65 and older
Person aged 45–64

0.299***
(0.019)
0.047
(0.031)

Share of population aged 45–64
French/Italian-speaking person

3,986
(4.701)
0.082***
(0.026)
–6.187***
(0.369)

French/Italian-speaking community
House owner

0.063**
(0.028)

Taxable income per capita in 1’000 CHF
Person with secondary education

0.088***
(0.018)
0.169***
(0.031)

Share of persons with secondary education
Person with tertiary education

0.271***
(0.023)
0.220***
(0.032)

Share of persons with tertiary education
Distrust in government
Adjusted R2
Number of observations

0.294***
(0.030)
0.092***
(0.027)
0.249
881

0.912
2,401

Notes : The dependent variable is the decision taken in the vote (approval of annuity reduction=1, decline annuity reduction=0,
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1

apartment or house (as a proxy for wealth) were slightly more likely to favor
the reform (though the effect is not signiﬁcant). Individuals with a high
income (and presumably better education) already face lower de facto
annuity rates and would consequently have been less affected by the reform,
since the politically ﬁxed annuity rate only concerned contribution on
income below a certain threshold.
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Overly generous nominal income guarantees implicit in the high conversion rate also limit the ability of pension funds to adjust pensions to the rate of
inﬂation. Surprising to an economist, this aspect was almost completely
ignored in the public discussion preceding the vote. A plausible explanation
is that voters’ perceptions and preferences might be inﬂuenced by past
experiences. Not having had signiﬁcant inﬂation during the past three decades, the Swiss may have forgotten just how important indexing annuities is.
Taken together, these results demonstrate not only the difﬁculty of
reforming a generous pension system with large vested interest, but
also the importance for the government (or private pension sponsors) of
gaining trust and coming up with convincing proposals. That people vote
in their own interest need not make reforms more difﬁcult. In our
example, the grandfathering of the elderly brought important support for
the reform. That the proposal was not accepted, nonetheless, also reﬂects
the failure to convince an important group of potential beneﬁciaries, the
younger voters.

Conclusion
The Swiss three pillar retirement system provides policymakers with a rich
context to explore policy revisions. Switzerland has a very comprehensive
pension scheme based on two main pillars, in which a large element of
retirement income comes from a mandatory occupational pension scheme.
While individuals in Swiss occupational pension plans do not have much
choice during the accumulation phase, they have considerable freedom in
choosing how their capital will be paid out at retirement. This feature has
the potential to undermine the adequacy of retirement income, especially
for low- and middle-income earners and may lead to additional governmental expenditures in the form of means-tested beneﬁts. Nonetheless, Switzerland still has relatively high annuitization rates compared to other countries,
with only approximately 30 percent of individuals cashing out their second
pillar. Payout choices are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by default options and
peer effects. While behavioral anomalies have attracted quite a bit of attention and research in recent years, a bigger challenge for policymakers may
be what to do when individuals behave rationally, strategically exploiting the
interactions between the different income schemes in old age. The annuitization pattern in Switzerland supports the interpretation of rational individuals taking into account the possibility of claiming means-tested social
assistance once wealth is depleted. The impact of the divorce law’s new
treatment of pensions provides another piece of evidence on the prevalence
of rational decision-making at advanced ages.
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In view of institutional peculiarities and a strong impact of historical and
societal context, it is difﬁcult to come up with straightforward lessons for
another country. A general ﬁnding from our analysis is that individual
pension decisions involve both rational and behavioral factors. As in Switzerland, and unlike in many European countries, US individuals are used to
taking large ﬁnancial decisions concerning their pension wealth. It would
thus be surprising to see completely different decision patterns in the
US. Recent evidence on long-term care by Brown and Finkelstein (2008)
supports the interpretation that individuals come up with choices that look
close to the predictions from rational forward-looking optimization models.
These ﬁndings lend support to the view that improving ﬁnancial literacy is a
very important component in policymaking with regard to pension reforms.
Nudging might do the trick when it comes to technical points or some
tactical decisions, but it cannot replace education and information in an
increasingly complex pension world.
The Swiss experience also demonstrates that political constraints should
be taken seriously in reforming the pension system. Our small example
illustrates that gaining a majority for a painful reform to the pension system
is not an easy task. While many determinants of a reform support are not
surprising, our results show the importance of cultural and historical factors
as well as general trust in the government. In view of fast population aging, it
seems easier to implement reforms that grandfather individuals already in
retirement, such as an increase in retirement age.
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